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MALICIOUS CONTENT ON THE INTERNET: 
NARROWING IMMUNITY UNDER THE 
COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT 
JOANNA SCHORR† 
INTRODUCTION 
One afternoon at a prestigious United States university, a 
new thread titled “[b]iggest slut on campus” appeared on the 
anonymous online gossip website JuicyCampus.com.1  Those who 
could not resist the urge to peruse the thread were inundated 
with the names of female students who attended that prestigious 
university.  Some posts included both the first and last names of 
the students.2  Some posts included the women’s phone 
numbers.3  All the posts libelously declared that these women 
were “sluts” with all the impurity and shame that the term 
entails.  The law has long given special treatment to statements 
imputing impurity for a woman4 because of the potentially 
harmful repercussions of those statements.  When future 
employers searched the names of these female students on the 
Internet, posts from JuicyCampus surfaced with claims that  
 
 
† Articles Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., 2013, St. John’s University 
School of Law; B.A., 2010, Brandeis University. Special thanks to Vice Dean 
Emeritus Andrew J. Simons for his guidance and support in writing this Note. 
1 See, e.g., Lawsuits, Weak Economy Kill JuicyCampus.com, FOX NEWS (Feb. 5, 
2009), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,488424,00.html [hereinafter Lawsuits]. 
The situation presented in this introduction is a hypothetical situation based on 
facts taken from a variety of true stories about JuicyCampus. 
2 See, e.g., What You Don’t Know Can’t Hurt You, THE DAILY BEAST (Dec. 8, 
2007, 6:38 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2007/12/08/what-you-don-t-
know-can-hurt-you.html. 
3 See, e.g., William Creeley, Regarding JuicyCampus.com, THE FIRE (Mar. 21, 
2008), http://thefire.org/article/9065.html. 
4 Imputing impurity for a woman is one of four categories of defamation per se 
which do not require proof of special damages. See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., 
PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 891–92 (12th ed. 
2010). 
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everyone on campus has had sex with these women.  These 
bright, engaging women were victims of JuicyCampus’ proactive 
campaign inducing college students to “[g]ive us the juice.”5 
The sinister and malicious website grew rapidly.  On 
Monday, October 6, 2008, JuicyCampus announced that the 
completely anonymous gossip website was accessible on 500 
campuses.6  JuicyCampus provided an anonymous forum for 
users to post salacious comments about their peers with no 
restrictions, supervision, or censure.7  In addition to “[b]iggest 
slut on campus,” topic threads on these 500 campuses included 
“easiest freshmen,”8 “ugliest sorority girl,”9 and “[g]ayest [f]rat 
[b]oys,”10 among others.  Not only could anyone create threads 
and post comments, anyone with access to the Internet could 
read the website. 
Despite the impact of the vicious words circulating through 
JuicyCampus, the targeted students had no recourse.  The reason 
that the targeted students had no recourse is that the 
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (“CDA”)11 immunizes 
websites like JuicyCampus that do not actually post the 
comments, but rather allow third parties to post comments.  The 
CDA’s broad immunity for website owners poses a problem for 
victims since action can only be taken against the individual 
user.12  Taking action against the initial poster is small solace for 
 
5 Dhwani Shah, JuicyCampus Gushes Gossip, THE DAILY PRINCETONIAN (Feb. 
22, 2008), http://www.dailyprincetonian.com/2008/02/22/20117/. The website’s slogan 
was “Always Anonymous . . . Always Juicy.” Does JuicyCampus Go Too Far?, CBS 
NEWS (Feb. 26, 2010, 11:03 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-500163_162-
3968514.html. 
6 500 Campuses!!!, OFFICIAL JUICYCAMPUS BLOG (Oct. 6, 2008, 11:12 AM), 
http://juicycampus.blogspot.com/search?updated-max=2008-10-24T14:34:00-07:00 
&max-results=7. 
7 See generally Richard Bernstein, The Growing Cowardice of Online 
Anonymity, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/27/world/ 
americas/27iht-letter.1.15670185.html. 
8 Lawsuits, supra note 1. 
9 See Bella English, Dorm Rumors, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 29, 2008, at G10. 
10 See Jeffrey R. Young, JuicyCampus Shuts Down, Blaming the Economy, Not 
the Controversy, THE CHRONICLE (Feb. 5, 2009), http://chronicle.com/article/ 
JuicyCampus-Shuts-Down/1506/. 
11 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012). 
12 Immunity for Online Publishers Under the Communications Decency Act, 
CITIZEN MEDIA LAW PROJECT (Feb. 18, 2011), http://www.citmedialaw.org/legal-
guide/immunity-online-publishers-under-communications-decency-act (“Section 230 
does not immunize the actual creator of content. The author of a defamatory 
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three reasons.  First, the damage suffered is disproportionate to 
the amount the individual can pay.13  Second, it is difficult to 
identify the poster because in the case of JuicyCampus, and 
many similar websites, users post anonymously,14 and it is nearly 
impossible to trace those anonymous users.15  Finally, litigation 
costs outweigh the benefit of a lawsuit because lawsuits against 
such individuals often provide limited, if any, financial benefit.16 
The problem is that JuicyCampus is but one of many 
websites17 that solicit malicious content.  These websites target 
college campuses, small towns, and even business competitors.18  
In each of these cases the websites actively solicit defamatory 
content, but because of the CDA they are immune from the 
consequences of their actions. 
This Note argues that the scope of CDA § 230, which 
provides immunity to Internet Service Providers in defamation 
suits for content posted by third-party users,19 should be 
narrowed in circumstances where a website actively solicits 
 
statement, whether he is a blogger, commenter, or anything else, remains just as 
responsible for his online statements as he would be for his offline statements.”). 
13 See Richard Morgan, A Crash Course in Online Gossip, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 
2008, at ST7. 
14 Id. 
15 See JuicyCampus.com Gives Forum to Anonymous Posters, THE UNIVERSITY 
DAILY KANSAN (Oct. 8, 2008), http://kansan.com/archives/2008/10/08/juicycampus-
com-gives-forum-to-anonymous-posters/. 
16 See Ian C. Ballon, The Good Samaritan Exemption and the CDA, in E-
COMMERCE AND INTERNET LAW: A LEGAL TREATISE WITH FORMS 528 (PLI Patents, 
Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Ser. No. 19009, 2d ed. 
2009); see also Sean P. Trende, Defamation, Anti-SLAPP Legislation, and the 
Blogosphere: New Solutions for an Old Problem, 44 DUQ. L. REV. 607, 631 (2006) 
(“While none of these major corporations are eager to expend money on litigation, 
they certainly have the resources to do so if necessary. For the average blogger, this 
is simply not the case. Given that the average associate salary at many large firms is 
around $300 per hour, a motion to dismiss and reply brief that took forty hours to 
write, edit, and file would place the cost of litigation at $12,000. This assumes the 
associate did all of the work, no oral argument is granted, and no discovery is served 
with the motion. If a partner edits the brief, her $500 per hour rate would break the 
bank for most individuals.”). 
17 JuicyCampus has since shutdown, purportedly a result of recent “economic 
downturn.” See Lawsuits, supra note 1. However, JuicyCampus was but one of many 
of these soliciting websites, for example, campusgossip.com, collegeacb.com, 
gossipreport.com, rottenneighbor.com, and thedirty.com. 
18 See, e.g., Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of N.Y. Inc., 17 N.Y.3d 281, 284–85, 952 
N.E.2d 1011, 1014, 929 N.Y.S.2d 19, 22 (2011); Morgan, supra note 13; A.G. 
Sulzberger, In Small Towns, Gossip Moves to the Web, and Turns Vicious, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 20, 2011, at A1. 
19 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012). 
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malicious content from its users.  Part I discusses gossip websites 
and blogs that are currently immunized by § 230 and analyzes 
social issues that result from the broad interpretation of the 
CDA.  Part II briefly discusses the law of defamation, followed by 
a discussion of the policies behind the CDA’s enactment, and the 
statute’s current scope in regard to defamation suits.  Part III 
analyzes the flaws of the different approaches currently 
employed by the courts to determine whether a website qualifies 
for § 230 immunity.  Part IV argues that removing websites that 
solicit malicious content from the scope of the CDA will better 
uphold the core policies behind its enactment. 
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE INTERNET 
There is a steady trend on the Internet for websites to host 
anonymous threads that solicit content that has a tendency to be 
defamatory.20  The communities most affected by this 
questionable behavior are college and high school campuses, 
small towns, and business competitors.21  Despite the varied 
settings of these communities, one solution would suffice to 
remedy the problem in all of these communities. 
A. JuicyCampus and Related Websites 
Perhaps the most notorious website to solicit defamatory 
content from its users is JuicyCampus.com.  JuicyCampus was a 
website that plagued college campuses, asking its users to 
“C’mon.  Give us the juice”22 by anonymously posting gossip 
about their peers.  The New York Times described JuicyCampus 
as a website that “allows students to participate in a collegiate 
version of celebrity gossip sites like TMZ.com and 
PerezHilton.com; it is a dorm bathroom wall writ large, one that 
anyone with Internet access can read from and post to.”23  The 
most prevalent topics were promiscuity, intelligence, 
attractiveness, and superlatives about different fraternities and  
 
 
 
 
20 See supra Introduction. 
21 See infra Part I.A–C. 
22 Shah, supra note 5. 
23 Morgan, supra note 13. 
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sororities on campus.24  Other threads “identified women who 
had gained weight and one post named a rape victim and said 
she ‘deserved it.’ ”25 
Although JuicyCampus founder and Chief Executive Officer 
Matt Ivester shut down the website in February 2009, other 
similar anonymous gossip websites happily filled the void.  In 
fact, JuicyCampus redirected all traffic to College Anonymous 
Confessions Board (“Collegeacb”).26  Collegeacb was a similar 
website to JuicyCampus, soliciting anonymous collegiate gossip.27  
Some topic threads on Collegeacb included “Best Ass—whose got 
it?” and “Which Freshman girls are blackballed from houses.”28  
Following the sale of Collegeacb, the redirection link on 
JuicyCampus’ remaining blog redirects to blipdar.net, another 
website that purports to be “the world’s leading website for 
venting, sharing and being yourself” anonymously.29  Other 
gossip websites have infiltrated high school campuses like 
littlegossip.com and isharegossip.com.30  Littlegossip.com eclipses 
JuicyCampus by permeating international borders, urging its 
users to “[f]ind the gossip in YOUR university/college/office about 
someone you know, rate it, or make your own!”31 
Despite suffering emotional trauma, pain, embarrassment, 
and potential career sabotage, victims have no form of recourse 
because of the courts’ broad interpretation of § 230, among other 
factors.  First, as the courts currently interpret CDA § 230, these 
gossip websites are immune from liability.32  Second, 
 
24 See id. 
25 Lawsuits, supra note 1. 
26 Shutdown FAQs, OFFICIAL JUICYCAMPUS BLOG (Feb. 4, 2009, 11:41 AM), 
http://juicycampus.blogspot.com; see also Nora Sorena Casey, Juicy Campus Folds 
Citing Lack of Funds, Makes Way for New Student Gossip Site, THE CHICAGO 
MAROON (Feb. 10, 2009), http://chicagomaroon.com/2009/02/10/juicy-campus-folds-
citing-lack-of-funds-makes-way-for-new-student-gossip-site/. 
27 See generally JuicyCampus Closing, COLLEGE ACB (Feb. 5, 2009), 
http://collegeacb.blogspot.com/2009/02/juicy-campus-closing_05.html. 
28 Carolyn Witte, Why We Should All Hate College ACB, THE CORNELL DAILY 
SUN, Apr. 6, 2010, http://cornellsun.com/node/41938. 
29 Maggie McGlinchy, Greek Life in the Post-CollegeACB Era, ONWARD STATE, 
http://onwardstate.com/2011/10/06/greek-life-in-the-post-collegeacb-era/ (last visited 
Mar. 21, 2013).  
30 See LITTLEGOSSIP, http://www.littlegossip.com/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2013); 
see also iShare Gossip Anonymous Gossip Website Targeted, SILENT SENDER (Apr. 
12, 2011), http://silentsender.blogspot.com/2011/04/isharegossip-anonymous-gossip-
website.html. 
31 LITTLEGOSSIP, http://www.littlegossip.com/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2014). 
32 See infra Part II.D.1. 
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JuicyCampus, in particular, was “designed to shield its users 
from the threat of libel claims . . . . [I]t logs the numeric Internet 
protocol addresses of its users, but does not associate those 
addresses with specific posts.  That is unlike mainstream social 
networking sites, which do maintain such detailed logs.”33  Even 
if the individual poster could be identified, more often than not 
there is minimal financial benefit to suing the individual.34  
However, some form of recourse against websites may help 
vindicate the victim and supply justice. 
Moreover, granting gossip websites immunity encourages 
cyberbullying.  Cyberbullying has become one of the most 
prevalent issues facing today’s adolescents.35  One of the 
contributing factors to cyberbullying is that it can be achieved 
anonymously.36  Anonymity lowers inhibitions37 and increases the 
feeling of freedom of expression, regardless of how hurtful, 
immoral, or illegal that statement may be.38  While there are 
many ramifications of cyberbullying, the most devastating 
consequences are that adolescents have committed suicide39 and 
taken violent steps against others in response to the content 
posted on the Internet.40 
 
33 Justin Pope, Students Fight Back Against Popular Juicy Campus Site, 
OCALA.COM (Feb. 18, 2008, 6:30 AM), http://www.ocala.com/article/20080218/ 
NEWS/802180328?p=4&tc=pg; see also Witte, supra note 28. 
34 See Ballon, supra note 16. 
35 Kaveri Subrahmanyam & Patricia Greenfield, Online Communication and 
Adolescent Relationships, 18 FUTURE CHILD. 119, 127 (2008) (“The news media are 
increasingly reporting that adolescents are using electronic technologies . . . to bully 
and victimize their peers. . . . 9 percent of young Internet users reported being 
harassed online in the previous year.”). 
36 Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, Cyberbullying: An Exploratory Analysis 
of Factors Related to Offending and Victimization, 29 DEVIANT BEHAV. 129, 135 
(2008), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01639620701457816. 
37 Dorothy E. Leidner & Sirkka L. Jarvenpaa, The Use of Information 
Technology To Enhance Management School Education: A Theoretical View, 19 MIS 
Q. 265, 279 (1995). 
38 See Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 36, at 134. 
39 Megan Meier, a thirteen-year-old girl, committed suicide after her classmate’s 
parent posed as a thirteen-year-old boy who courted her for a week and then sent 
her a message that “[t]he world would be a better place without [her].” Jennifer 
Steinhauer, Woman Found Guilty in Web Fraud Tied to Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
27, 2008, at A25. Tyler Clementi, an eighteen-year-old student at Rutgers 
University, committed suicide after his roommate streamed Tyler being intimate 
with another man over the Internet. Nate Schweber, Parents of Student Who 
Committed Suicide Tell Rutgers University They May Sue, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 
2010, at A30. 
40 See Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 36, at 136. 
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B. Small Town Gossip Mills 
High school and college campuses are not the only 
communities harmed by the content of such gossip websites.  
Topix.com (“Topix”) “opened[ed] up [its] site, adding forums, to 
give anyone the power to discuss, edit and share the news that 
matters to them.”41  Instead of focusing on college campuses, 
Topix developed a website that allowed anonymous posting on 
“[y]our town.  Your news. Your take.”42  Topix is less frequented 
in big cities than it is in small, rural towns.43  The nature of 
smaller towns increases the potential for embarrassment and 
injured reputations as a result of contemptuous and harmful 
comments.44 
One local town, Mountain Grove, Missouri, has been 
victimized by the recklessly harmful nature of the website 
postings.45  The owner of the local diner “called Topix a ‘cesspool 
of character assassination.’ ”46  One mother of two was called “a 
methed-out, doped-out whore with AIDS,” none of it being true.47  
The effects of these comments caused this mother to contemplate 
suicide.48  Instead, she decided to move her family out of town.49 
Similarly to victims of gossip websites targeting students, 
victims of Topix forums also have no form of recourse.  After 
thirty state attorney generals challenged the website, Topix 
ceased charging for removal of defamatory comments.50  Despite 
increasing ease in removing comments, the website is still 
immune from defamation suits under the CDA § 230 like the 
other malicious gossip sites. 
C. Business Competitors 
The business world also falls victim to anonymous 
defamatory content.  Some businesses host blogs seeking 
negative information about their competitors.  Recently in New 
 
41 About Topix, TOPIX, http://www.topix.com/topix/about (last visited Jan. 18, 
2014). 
42 Id. 
43 See Sulzberger, supra note 18. 
44 See id. 
45 See id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 See id. 
50 Id. 
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York, the Court of Appeals decided a case in which a real estate 
company’s blog solicited malicious comments about a business 
competitor.51  Christakis Shiamili ran a New York City rental 
and sales real estate company, Ardor Realty Corp.52  Shiamili’s 
competitor, Real Estate Group of New York, Inc. (“Real Estate”), 
operated an online blog focusing on New York City real estate.53  
A third-party user posted a comment making allegedly 
defamatory comments “under the pseudonym ‘Ardor Realty 
Sucks.’ ”54  The comments included accusations that “Shiamili 
mistreated his employees and was racist and anti-Semitic.”55  
Real Estate’s website administrator upgraded the comment by 
“Ardor Real Estate Sucks” to an independent post, adding the 
heading, “ ‘Ardor Realty and Those People’ ”; the subheading, 
“ ‘and now it’s time for your weekly dose of hate, brought to you 
unedited, once again, by ‘Ardor Realty Sucks’.  and for the record, 
we are so.  not.  afraid’ ”; and an image depicting Jesus Christ 
with Shiamili’s face and the words “Chris Shiamili: King of the 
Token Jews.”56  Beneath the post was an open thread in which 
anonymous users posted further allegedly defamatory content 
about Shiamili, including that his business was facing financial 
trouble and that he abused and cheated on his wife.57  Shiamili 
asked Real Estate’s website administrator to remove the 
comments.58  His request was denied.59  Like victims of the 
aforementioned websites, Shiamili had no form of recourse.  
Although he sued, the Court of Appeals upheld Real Estate’s 
immunity under § 230.60 
 
 
51 These facts originate from Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of N.Y., Inc., 17 
N.Y.3d 281, 284–85, 952 N.E.2d 1011, 1014–15, 929 N.Y.S.2d 19, 22–23 (2011). For a 
full discussion of the holding and dissent of this case see infra Part III.A. 
52 Shiamili, 17 N.Y.3d at 284, 952 N.E.2d at 1014, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 22. 
53 Id. at 284–85, 952 N.E.2d at 1014, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 22. 
54 Id. at 285, 952 N.E.2d at 1014, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 22. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 See infra Part III.A.1. 
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II. INTERSECTION OF THE LAW OF DEFAMATION AND THE CDA 
CDA § 230 was established in 1996,61 and its history has ever 
since been intertwined with defamation litigation.62  This section 
gives an overview of the law of defamation as it applies in CDA 
litigation, followed by a discussion of the evolution of CDA § 230 
from its enactment through its current scope. 
A. A Brief Overview of Defamation Law 
In order to comprehend the impact of § 230 immunity, one 
should have a basic understanding of defamation law.  
Originating at common law, defamation was an implacable 
offense.63  Statements that tended to harm one’s reputation were 
presumed false and strict liability applied.64  In New York Times 
Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court held that public officials and 
public figures are required to prove “actual malice” in order to 
prove that a particular statement is defamatory.65  Rosenbloom v. 
Metromedia, Inc. further extended the New York Times actual 
malice test to private parties caught up in newsworthy events.66  
Despite these decisions, states still retain the authority to 
determine what constitutes defamation.67  In most states, there 
are certain types of statements that are recognized as defamatory 
per se, meaning that “the publication is of such a character as to 
make the publisher liable for defamation although no special 
harm results from it.”68  There are four types of statements that 
are generally recognized as defamation per se: (1) imputing 
“criminal conduct or offense”; (2) imputing “a loathsome disease”; 
 
61 See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012). 
62 See SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, at 901. 
63 Pete Kennedy, Internet Libel – The Anonymous Writer and the Online 
Publisher, 52 ADVOCATE 59, 59 (2010), available at http://gdhm.com/images/pdf/pdk-
internet-libel-the-anonymous-writer-and-the-online-publisher.pdf. 
64 Id. 
65 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (establishing “a 
federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory 
falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was 
made with ‘actual malice’ ”). 
66 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 43 (1971), abrogated by Gertz v. 
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343–46 (1974). 
67 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345–46 (1974) (“For these reasons we conclude that the 
States should retain substantial latitude in their efforts to enforce a legal remedy for 
defamatory falsehood injurious to the reputation of a private individual.”). 
68 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 569 cmt. b (1977). A minority of courts 
hold that a statement only qualifies as defamation per se if “its defamatory meaning 
is apparent on its face and without reference to extrinsic facts.” Id. 
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(3) imputing “misconduct, lack of integrity or inability in a 
person’s trade, profession, office, or occupation”; and (4) imputing 
unchastity to a woman.69  When § 230 immunity is triggered, 
however, even victims of comments that are defamatory per se 
have no form of recourse. 
B. The Policy Reasons for Enactment 
CDA § 230 was enacted in response to Stratton Oakmont, 
Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.,70 a New York Supreme Court case 
that found liability based on the defendant’s status as a 
“publisher.”71  In that case, Prodigy operated a “computer bulletin 
board” upon which third-party users could post “stock[], 
investment[] and other financial [information].”72  One 
unidentified user posted comments about Stratton, a securities 
investment banking firm.73  One of the several comments stated 
that “STRATTON’s president, committed criminal and 
fraudulent acts in connection with the initial public offering of 
stock of Solomon-Page Ltd.”74  The court held that Prodigy was 
liable for the defamatory statements because it was acting as a 
publisher.75  The court labeled Prodigy a publisher because 
Prodigy “actively utiliz[ed] technology and manpower to delete 
notes from its computer bulletin boards on the basis of 
offensiveness and ‘bad taste’ . . . PRODIGY [was] clearly making 
decisions as to content, and such decisions constitute editorial 
control.”76  Thus, Prodigy “uniquely arrogated to itself the role of 
determining what is proper for its members to post and read on 
its bulletin boards.”77  This decision effectively discouraged  
 
 
 
69 50 AM. JUR. 2D Libel and Slander § 137 (2012); see also N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW 
§ 77 (McKinney 2011). 
70 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995). 
71 Id. at *4–5. 
72 Id. at *1. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at *3 (“A finding that PRODIGY is a publisher is the first hurdle for 
Plaintiffs to overcome in pursuit of their defamation claims, because one who 
repeats or otherwise republishes a libel is subject to liability as if he had originally 
published it.” (citing Cianci v. New Times Pub. Co., 639 F.2d 54, 61 (2d Cir. 1980); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (1977))). 
76 Id. at *4 (citations omitted). 
77 Id. 
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website operators from self-policing and removing unsatisfactory 
content because they feared that they may be held liable as a 
publisher in tort actions, specifically defamation suits.78 
In response to Stratton, Congress recognized the policy 
concerns that accompany holding website operators liable as 
publishers for third-party content by passing § 230.79  Prior to the 
enactment of § 230, a website that maintained any control over 
the content of the website was considered a publisher.80  The 
definition for publisher applied in print media was simply 
applied to the Internet.81  The holding in Stratton highlighted the 
problem with applying such a broad definition of publisher to the 
Internet:  Websites that monitored third-party content, but did 
not contribute content of its own, were considered liable for 
defamation for statements posted to their website.82  Holding 
websites liable for third-party content would seemingly deter 
people from hosting websites on the Internet, which at that time 
was still in its infancy. 
Congress explained in § 230(b) that it wanted “to promote 
the continued development of the Internet and other interactive 
computer services and other interactive media” by shielding 
internet publishers from tort liability.83  At the time, the Internet 
was still a relatively new medium.  It possessed the ability to 
quickly and efficiently disperse copious amounts of information 
over unlimited geographical areas and at the behest of the user, 
unlike any other medium.84  Most importantly, the Internet 
opened the door for discussion between those providing the 
information and those receiving the information, an ability that 
television, the radio, and print media lacked to the same extent.85  
As the public’s ability to engage in interactive speech increased, 
controversial, derogatory, and defamatory comments were bound 
 
78 See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997). 
79 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2012); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331 (citing Stratton Oakmont, 
Inc., 1995 WL 323710) (“In this respect, § 230 responded to a New York state court 
decision, Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co.”). 
80 See generally Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 1995 WL 323710. 
81 See id. at *5. 
82 See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331. 
83 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1) (2012). 
84 See generally Tim Berners-Lee, Long Live the Web: A Call for Continued Open 
Standards and Neutrality, 303 SCI. AM. 80 (2010), available at 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=long-live-the-web (discussing the 
history and development of the World Wide Web). 
85 See id. 
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to grow as well.  Congress recognized that in order for people to 
be willing to operate and establish websites that allow for third-
party postings, website operators should not be deterred from 
monitoring and regulating “obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, 
excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable” 
content posted by third parties on Internet forums.86 
C. Section 230’s Definitional Distinctions 
Section 230 distinguishes between two different kinds of 
websites, creating two categories:  “Internet computer services” 
and “information content providers.”  Congress defines Internet 
computer services, more commonly referred to as Internet service 
providers (“ISPs”), as “any information service, system, or access 
software provider that provides or enables computer access by 
multiple users to a computer server.”87  These definitions were 
established in order to differentiate between publishers on the 
Internet and publishers in all other media.  Under conventional 
defamation laws, publishers are liable for defamatory 
comments.88  However, Congress ensured that ISPs would not be 
treated the same as publishers in other media under the CDA.  
Congress created a separate genre for websites, thereby 
removing ISPs from the sweeping definition of publishers 
because they did not post any content themselves.  As a result, 
ISPs are immunized in defamation suits.  Comparatively, 
information content providers (“ICPs”) are essentially publishers 
as defined in Stratton.  ICPs are those parties that are 
“responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development 
of information provided through the Internet or any other 
interactive computer service.”89  ICPs, unlike ISPs, are not 
immune from defamation suits because they are considered 
publishers under the CDA.90  ICPs constitute publishers because 
they contribute substantially to the content of the website.91 
By distinguishing between ISPs and ICPs, Congress 
addressed the policy concern raised by Stratton that website 
operators and publishers would refrain from self-policing the 
 
86 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)–(c). 
87 Id. at (f)(2). 
88 See SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, at 900. 
89 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3). 
90 See id. 
91 See id. 
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content posted on their sites if such responsible actions would 
result in potential liability.  Section 230(c) offers “[p]rotection for 
‘good samaritan’ blocking and screening of offensive material,”92 a 
direct response to Stratton.93  Section 230(c) states, “[n]o provider 
or user of an [ISP] shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of 
any information provided by another information content 
provider.”94  The Act further asserts that interactive computer 
service providers cannot be held liable for “any action voluntarily 
taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material 
that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, 
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise 
objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally 
protected.”95  This statement was meant to encourage website 
operators to monitor their websites for objectionable content 
without fear of retribution for being responsible.96 
D. The Appellate Courts’ Approaches to § 230 
1. Zeran and Its Progeny 
The Fourth Circuit in Zeran v. American Online97 was the 
first to address the scope of the immunity provided by CDA 
§ 230.  In Zeran, the court held that America Online, Inc. (“AOL”) 
was an ISP and therefore immune from liability for content 
posted by a third party.98  The suit arose when an unidentified 
third party posted fictitious advertisements for t-shirts with 
inappropriate slogans related to the 1995 bombing of a federal 
building in Oklahoma City.99  The post included Zeran’s home 
phone number, which was also the number he used to run his 
business.  As a result, Zeran was inundated with phone calls.100  
 
92 See id. § 230(c). 
93 Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) (“[One] purpose of 
§ 230 was to encourage service providers to self-regulate the dissemination of 
offensive material over their services. In this respect, § 230 responded to a New York 
state court decision, Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).”). 
94 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). 
95 Id. at (c)(2)(A). 
96 Id. at (b). 
97 129 F.3d 327. 
98 See id. at 328. 
99 Id. at 329. 
100 Id. 
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Zeran contacted AOL and asked that the post be removed.101  
Although AOL indicated it would remove the post, the post was 
not removed, and the phone calls persisted.102  Zeran filed a 
negligence suit against AOL for failure to remove and retract the 
defamatory statements.103  The district court granted AOL’s 
motion for judgment on the pleadings.104  Ultimately, the court 
held that AOL was merely acting as an ISP because it was not 
the primary content provider, thereby triggering § 230 
immunity.105 
The Zeran decision drew a distinction between distributors 
of online content and distributors of print content for purposes of 
immunity under CDA § 230.106  By classifying AOL as an ISP, the 
Fourth Circuit established a judicial precedent that extended the 
protections of the CDA § 230 to any online content distributor.107  
Zeran, therefore, found that § 230 provides immunity to online 
distributors in defamation suits where, had the same content 
been distributed in hard print, the publisher’s liability would 
have been determined under the applicable state defamation 
laws.108  Zeran prevails as the majority view.109 
Two notable cases expanded the definition of what 
constitutes a publisher under the CDA § 230 by adopting the 
Zeran analysis.  In Batzel v. Smith,110 the Ninth Circuit held that  
 
 
101 Id. 
102 See id. 
103 Id. at 328. Zeran never filed suit against the original poster, claiming that 
“AOL made it impossible to identify the original party.” Id. at 329 n.1. 
104 Id. at 329–30. 
105 Id. at 332–33 (“The computer service provider must decide whether to 
publish, edit, or withdraw the posting. In this respect, Zeran seeks to impose 
liability on AOL for assuming the role for which § 230 specifically proscribes 
liability-the publisher role.”). 
106 See id. at 330–31. 
107 David R. Sheridan, Zeran v. AOL and the Effect of Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act Upon Liability for Defamation on the Internet, 61 ALB. 
L. REV. 147, 149 (1997) (“Under Zeran, the publisher of a print newspaper could face 
liability for printing a defamatory letter to the editor, while the publisher of an 
electronic newspaper would be immune from liability for carrying unedited the same 
text, even if the publisher of the electronic newspaper acted with the requisite 
degree of culpability under state tort law.”). 
108 Id. 
109 See Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of N.Y., Inc., 17 N.Y.3d 281, 288, 952 N.E.2d 
1011, 1016, 929 N.Y.S.2d 19, 24 (2011). 
110 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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a service provider or user is immune from liability under 
§ 230(c)(1) when a third person . . . that created or developed the 
information . . . furnished it to the provider or user under 
circumstances in which a reasonable person in the position of 
the service provider or user would conclude that the information 
was provided for publication on the Internet.111 
In the case, a third party sent an e-mail to the website, Museum 
Security Network, alleging that Ellen Batzel possibly possessed 
artwork stolen from Jews during World War II.112  The website 
published the third-party e-mail to a Network listserv.113  Batzel’s 
holding expanded the scope of immunity to websites that post 
what was originally privately received third-party content under 
reasonable circumstances indicating that the private content was 
meant to be publicly dispersed. 
The Tenth Circuit also affirmed the Zeran holding in Ben 
Ezra, Weinstein, & Co., Inc. v. America Online Inc.114  In Ben 
Ezra, the court held that the service provider’s simple editing of 
content qualified it as a publisher.115  AOL provided stock 
quotation information that it received from third parties.116  Ben 
Ezra, Weinstein, and Company (“Ben Ezra”) sued AOL for 
defamation and negligence, alleging that AOL “published 
incorrect information concerning [Ben Ezra’s] stock price and 
share volume.”117  Ben Ezra argued that AOL was not immune 
under the CDA § 230 because, in addition to its role as an ISP, it 
acted as an ICP by working with the stock quotation developers 
in the creation and development of the information, a role mainly 
comprised of communicating with the providers and deleting 
incorrect symbols.118  The court held that deleting symbols from 
stock information was the role of a publisher and therefore, 
under Zeran, AOL constituted an ISP—as opposed to an ICP—
triggering § 230 immunity.119 
 
111 Id. at 1034. 
112 Id. at 1021. 
113 Id. at 1022. 
114 206 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 2000). 
115 See infra note 119 and accompanying text. 
116 Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d at 983. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 985. 
119 Id. at 985–86. 
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The Zeran line of cases provides a three-prong test for 
determining whether a defendant is immunized under § 230.120  
First, the defendant must be an ISP or ISP user.  Second, the 
defendant must have been acting as a publisher.  Third, the 
information at issue must have been provided by a third party.121  
This test pulls its requirements directly from the language of 
§ 230,122 interpreting the text literally.  If all three of these 
requirements are met, § 230 immunizes the defendant even if it 
would be liable under state defamation laws.123 
2. The Minority View 
Some courts have applied standards different from Zeran’s 
standard to cases involving § 230.124  In Doe v. GTE Corp.,125 for 
example, the plaintiff sued companies providing web hosting 
services to websites that were selling videos of undressing 
athletes recorded by hidden cameras in locker rooms.126  The 
Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision to dismiss the claim.127  
However, the court also explicitly rejected the Zeran approach to 
§ 230 in its analysis.128  Instead, the court provided two 
alternative interpretations of § 230.  The first interpretation 
 
120 Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1037 (9th Cir. 2003) (Gould, J., concurring in 
part, dissenting in part). 
121 Id. (“Three elements are thus required for § 230 immunity: (1) the defendant 
must be a provider or user of an ‘interactive computer service’; (2) the asserted 
claims must treat the defendant as a publisher or speaker of information; and (3) the 
challenged communication must be ‘information provided by another information 
content provider.’ ”). 
122 See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012). 
123 Gregory M. Dickinson, An Interpretive Framework for Narrower Immunity 
Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
863, 872–73 (2010) (“When confronted with facts that force a resolution of the 
ambiguous distinction between service provider and content provider, courts almost 
unfailingly resolve the issue in favor of immunity. Unless a service provider literally 
and unambiguously pens the words of the content in question, it will be immune 
from liability.”). 
124 Samuel J. Morley, How Broad Is Web Publisher Immunity Under §230 of the 
Communications Decency Act of 1996?, 84 FLA. B.J. 8, 12 (2010). 
125 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003). 
126 Id. at 656–57. 
127 Id. at 662. 
128 Id. at 660 (“If this reading is sound, then § 230(c) as a whole makes ISPs 
indifferent to the content of information they host or transmit: whether they do 
(subsection (c)(2)) or do not (subsection (c)(1)) take precautions, there is no liability 
under either state or federal law. . . . Why should a law designed to eliminate ISPs’ 
liability to the creators of offensive material end up defeating claims by the victims 
of tortious or criminal conduct?”). 
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reads § 230(c)(1) as a definitional clause.129  The second 
interpretation is to read § 230(c)(1) as “foreclos[ing] any liability 
that depends on deeming the ISP a ‘publisher’ . . . while 
permitting the states to regulate ISPs in their capacity as 
intermediaries.”130 
In FTC v. Accusearch Inc.,131 the Tenth Circuit held that 
encouraging illegal content undercuts immunity.132  In that case, 
a website “solicited requests for confidential information,” in the 
form of personal data “protected by law, paid researchers to find 
it,” and disclosed the protected information to paying 
customers.133  The website attempted to invoke the protections of 
§ 230 because the researchers who provided the information were 
third parties.134  This approach utilized the Zeran test as a basis 
for its analysis, but added two additional prongs: (1) whether the 
content was developed by the website; and (2) whether the 
website was responsible for the content in question.135  The first 
prong defines “develop” broadly, noting that “dictionary 
definitions for develop correspondingly revolve around the act of 
drawing something out, making it ‘visible,’ ‘active,’ or ‘usable.’ ”136  
The second prong requires that “one must be more than a neutral 
conduit for [the developed] content . . . . [A] service provider is 
‘responsible’ for the development of offensive content only if it in 
some way specifically encourages development of what is 
offensive about the content.”137  These additional prongs 
narrowed the scope of the analysis by requiring a more precise 
analysis of the facts of the case than the original Zeran test.  
Under the additional prongs, the court held that the website’s 
actions were not “neutral” because “its actions were intended to 
 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 570 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2009). 
132 Morley, supra note 124, at 15. 
133 FTC, 570 F.3d at 1201. 
134 Id. (“Accusearch attempts to portray itself as the provider of neutral tools, 
stressing that it merely provided ‘a forum in which people advertise and request’ 
telephone records.”). 
135 Id. at 1197–98 (“To begin with, we consider whether confidential telephone 
records are ‘developed,’ within the meaning of the CDA, when, as here, they are sold 
to the public over the Internet. . . . This conclusion, however, does not end the 
inquiry. The question remains whether Accusearch was . . . responsible for the 
development of the specific content that was the source of the alleged liability.”). 
136 Id. at 1198. 
137 Id. at 1199. 
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generate” offensive content and therefore lacked immunity.138  
Therefore, the website was responsible for the development of the 
content in question and was not protected by § 230 immunity.139 
III. CDA POLICY GOALS ARE NO LONGER SUPPORTED 
The primary problem with judicial interpretation of CDA 
§ 230 as it stands is that it fails to account for malicious content 
that ISP operators like JuicyCampus actively solicit.  The main 
issue behind this analytical gap is that the courts fail to 
incorporate an assessment of Congress’s policy objectives for 
enacting § 230.  This failure immunizes gossip websites despite 
the fact that behavior employed by these websites undermines 
the fundamental policy reasons for enacting the CDA.  Actively 
soliciting objectionable material strays from the two core goals of 
the CDA § 230: (1) promoting the growth of the Internet as a 
forum for free speech; and (2) encouraging website operators to 
monitor their content without fear that such action would 
implicate them as publishers and would therefore make them 
liable for objectionable content provided by third parties under 
state defamation laws.140  As a result, the current approaches to 
interpreting § 230 all have shortcomings. 
A. The Failures of Zeran 
Although the Zeran test adheres to the text of the CDA, it 
fails to consider the corresponding policy reasons for the section’s 
enactment.  This is evident in the holding of the New York Court 
of Appeals case, Shiamili v. Real Estate Group of New York, 
Inc.141  In Shiamili, Real Estate operated a blog soliciting 
imprudent comments about its business competitor, Shiamili.  
Shiamili sued after one comment posted under a pseudonym was 
upgraded to a stand-alone post, and more reckless and harmful 
comments were posted to a forum established below the 
upgraded post.142 
 
138 Id. at 1201. 
139 Id. at 1199, 1201. 
140 See supra Part II.B. 
141 See discussion supra Part I.C.  
142 See supra Part I.C. 
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1. The Holding 
In Shiamili, a split court adopted the Zeran line of 
reasoning, “read[ing] section 230 as generally immunizing 
Internet service providers from liability for third-party content 
wherever such liability depends on characterizing the provider as 
a ‘publisher or speaker’ of objectionable material.”143  The court 
utilized the three prongs of the Zeran test.  First, the court 
determined that the blog operator was an ISP.144  Like the courts 
before it, the court highlighted the difference between ISPs, 
which are shielded by the CDA § 230 when “the content at issue 
is provided by ‘another information content provider[,]’ ”145 and 
information content providers, which are not issued immunity for 
content they make available.146  Therefore, § 230 grants 
immunity to ISPs from state law liability.147  Second, under the 
Zeran line of cases, websites acting as publishers, by “deciding 
whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content,” are 
granted immunity as ISPs.148  Third, in this case the complaint 
alleged that a third-party user was responsible for the 
objectionable content, thereby failing to allege that Real Estate 
was the content provider.149  This fact lead the court to “reject 
Shiamili’s contention that defendants should be deemed content 
providers because they created and ran a Web site which 
implicitly encouraged users to post negative comments.”150  
Furthermore, the court reasoned, “[e]ven assuming that 
solicitation can constitute ‘development,’ this is plainly not a case 
 
143 Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of N.Y., Inc., 17 N.Y.3d 281, 288–89, 952 N.E.2d 
1011, 1017, 929 N.Y.S.2d 19, 25 (2011) (“Today, we follow what may fairly be called 
the national consensus.”). 
144 Id. at 290, 952 N.E.2d at 1018, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 26 (“Shiamili does not 
dispute that defendants, as alleged Web site operators, are providers of an 
‘interactive computer service’ under section 230.”). 
145 Id. at 289, 952 N.E.2d at 1017, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 25 (quoting 
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012)). 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 286, 952 N.E.2d at 1015, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 23 (“A defendant is therefore 
immune from state law liability if (1) it is a ‘provider or user of an interactive 
computer service’; (2) the complaint seeks to hold the defendant liable as a ‘publisher 
or speaker’; and (3) the action is based on ‘information provided by another 
information content provider.’ ”). 
148 Id. at 289, 952 N.E.2d at 1017, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 25 (citations omitted). 
149 Id. at 290, 952 N.E.2d at 1018, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 26. 
150 Id. at 290–91, 952 N.E.2d at 1018, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 26 (“Creating an open 
forum for third parties to post content—including negative commentary—is at the 
core of what section 230 protects.”). 
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where the Web site can be charged with soliciting the defamatory 
content at issue.”151  Fourth, while Real Estate may have been a 
content provider as to the heading, subheading, and illustration 
accompanying the upgraded post, this content is not actionable 
because the complaint does not allege its defamatory nature.152 
2. The Dissent 
Chief Judge Lippman strongly dissented and illustrated the 
failures of applying the Zeran test.153  The dissent refused to 
accept that Real Estate’s activity was “benign.”154  The dissent 
discussed the allegations of defendants’ “efforts to instigate 
additional attacks against plaintiff’s character and business”155 
and stated that “defendants’ attachment of this illustration, if 
proven, should alone defeat their immunity under the CDA.”156  
The dissent elaborated, discussing Congress’s intent to protect 
ISPs from liability when they were making a good faith effort to 
limit the “availability of material that the provider or user 
considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively 
violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable.”157  If this was the 
initial purpose of CDA § 230, the dissent argued, “an 
interpretation that immunizes a business’s complicity in 
defaming a direct competitor takes us so far afield from the 
purpose of the CDA as to make it unrecognizable.”158 
B. Insufficient Minority Approaches 
1. The Seventh Circuit’s Approaches 
The Seventh Circuit adopted two alternative readings of 
§ 230, both of which are insufficient.  The first is to read 
§ 230(c)(1) as a definitional clause.159  This reading removes 
 
151 Id. at 291, 952 N.E.2d at 1018, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 26. 
152 Id. at 292, 952 N.E.2d at 1019–20, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 27–28. 
153 Id. at 293–94, 952 N.E.2d at 1020, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 28 (Lippman, C.J., 
dissenting). 
154 Id. at 294, 952 N.E.2d at 1020, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 28 (“But, the allegations of 
defendants’ actions here are not so benign.”). 
155 Id. at 294, 952 N.E.2d at 1020–21, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 28–29. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 295, 952 N.E.2d at 1021, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 29 (quoting 
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) (2012)). 
158 Id. at 295, 952 N.E.2d at 1021–22, 929 N.Y.S. at 29–30. 
159 See Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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immunity only if the website “created the objectionable 
information.”160  Using creation as the determinative standard is 
circular in nature.  If the content was posted by a third party, the 
website could argue that it must have been created by the third 
party or it would have posted the content itself.  Under this logic, 
gossip websites and blogs would immunize themselves from 
liability by simply stating that they could not have created the 
content because it was created by the third-party poster. 
The second alternative reading simply “forecloses any 
liability that depends on deeming the ISP a ‘publisher[,]’ ”161 
which removes any remedy for those bringing defamation 
actions.  The court itself stated that “defamation law would be a 
good example of such” foreclosed liability.162  Therefore, this test 
is far more restrictive to defamation victims than even the Zeran 
test. 
2. The Flaws of the Tenth Circuit’s Approach 
The Tenth Circuit’s test comes closest to being effective 
because it considers the policy reasons for enacting § 230 by 
examining the neutrality or activeness of the website.  The 
court’s broad definition of “develop” implies that activities like 
solicitation would rise to the level of development.163  However, 
the test does not look at the nature of the website—other than 
distinguishing between an ISP and ICP.  Without taking this 
issue into account, the test fails to differentiate between websites 
that are intended to perform a community service and not merely 
defame, from those websites that are intended to spread 
malicious content.164  If a court does not consider the nature of 
the website, the broad definition of develop would encompass 
websites that solicit non-harmful content with the intent to 
perform a constructive service to the community.  Therefore, 
these constructive websites would not be immunized even though 
their immunization would uphold congressional intent.165 
 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
163 See FTC v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1198 (10th Cir. 2009). 
164 See infra Part IV.A. 
165 See supra Part II.B. 
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IV. CONSTRUCTING A NARROWER TEST 
It is evident that a new test is necessary to determine the 
scope of immunity under § 230 to better promote the 
congressional intent behind the statute.  The rise of actively 
unfriendly websites has contorted the Zeran analysis, providing 
immunity to those whom Congress never contemplated would be 
implicated by § 230.  Instead of self-policing, some websites 
solicit content that is in many cases defamatory per se, hiding 
behind § 230’s shield of immunity and proclaiming freedom of 
speech.  While § 230 certainly purported to promote freedom of 
speech, its ultimate goal was to protect those who were utilizing 
freedom of speech on the Internet in a responsible and civil way, 
those who would provide a medium for widespread exchange of 
valuable information in an immediate way—a responsible and 
legal Internet. 
This Note proposes modifying the Zeran test by adding three 
additional prongs to determine whether a website should receive 
§ 230 immunity.  As it stands, the Zeran line requires the court 
to begin with three questions: (1) is the defendant an ISP; (2) was 
the defendant acting as a publisher; and (3) was the content 
provided by a third party?166  After engaging in this analysis the 
court should contemplate three additional questions, all of which 
would need to be satisfied in order to remove immunity.  First, 
the court should determine whether the primary purpose of the 
website is constructive.  Second, the court should determine 
whether the ISP was active or passive in receiving and 
dispersing third-party content.  Factors that the court should 
consider include—but are not limited to—the following: whether 
the website solicits content; whether the website enhances the 
content in a significant way; and whether the website indicates 
its support of the third party.  Third, the court should determine 
whether the content at issue is objectionable on its face.  Factors 
that the court should consider include whether the particular 
content is defamatory per se under state law and whether the 
merits of the content at issue outweigh the alleged injury.  This 
Note does not suggest that the court stifle communication by 
holding it to be defamatory.  Rather, it argues that the immunity 
of the CDA be lifted in the appropriate circumstances so that a  
 
 
166 See supra Part II.D.1. 
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determination may be made in the appropriate forum as to 
whether the subject of the offending post has in fact been 
defamed. 
A. Primary Purpose Test 
The first additional prong recognizes that some websites 
solicit comments that are recklessly harmful but do so while 
contributing to social utility.  This test requires the court to 
determine whether the social utility of the website is greater 
than the harm inflicted by the content the website broadcasts.  
Websites that have greater social utility are constructive because 
they provide a service to the public.  This prong distinguishes 
websites like Yelp.com (“Yelp”) and Angieslist.com (“Angie’s 
List”), websites that solicit reviews of businesses from customers 
to inform the public, from those whose sole purpose is to display 
defamatory content.167  Yelp’s purpose is to “help people find 
great local businesses like dentists, hair stylists[,] and 
mechanics.”168  Moreover, Yelp’s general guidelines discourage 
users from posting inappropriate content and private 
information, something that gossip websites do not.169  Angie’s 
List takes greater measures than Yelp to ensure that content is 
of a certain caliber.  Angie’s List requires users to join and does 
not allow anonymous reviews.170  Gossip sites and the blog in 
question in Shiamili.171 do not contribute social utility.  Instead, 
their primary purpose is to broadcast defamatory content on the 
Internet.  Under this prong, websites distinguished as having a 
primary purpose that provides social utility would maintain 
immunity while those websites that do not perform a public 
service would have to satisfy the other two prongs of the analysis 
to maintain immunity.  Essentially, this prong would act as a 
safety mechanism for websites that have both a social purpose 
and may potentially run into trouble with defamatory comments. 
 
167 See, e.g., Write a Review, YELP, http://www.yelp.com/writeareview (last 
visited Jan. 18, 2014); Frequently Asked Questions, ANGIE’S LIST, 
http://angieslist.com/faq.aspx (last visited Jan. 18, 2014). 
168 About Us, YELP, http://www.yelp.com/about (last visited Jan. 18, 2014). 
169 See Content Guidelines, YELP, http://www.yelp.com/guidelines (last visited 
Jan. 18, 2014). 
170 How It Works, ANGIE’S LIST, http://www.angieslist.com/howitworks.aspx (last 
visited Jan. 18, 2014). 
171 See supra Part I. 
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B. Active v. Passive Solicitation 
The second additional prong recognizes that ISPs are not 
always innocent bystanders to third-party content and when they 
are not, they should not be rewarded as such.  The majority test 
assumes that message boards and open forums allowing third 
parties to comment unsupervised are all alike in their 
neutrality.172  In the current Internet age, this is not the case.  
Based on the discussion of gossip websites and Shiamili above,173 
it is clear that soliciting harmful content should implicate ISPs 
as “responsible” for the objectionable content and not protect 
them as mere neutral service providers. 
If a website actively solicits harmful content, § 230 immunity 
will not apply.  A website actively solicits content when it seeks 
out posts and comments of a certain kind.  Solicitation by nature 
indicates a potential responsibility for the content.  Simply 
defined, to solicit means to request.  In determining whether the 
website solicited the content, a court should consider the two 
different types of solicitation: neutral and intentional.  Neutral 
solicitation can be illustrated by the following example:  A 
website like the The New York Times posts news articles with 
space beneath for comments on the article.174  By posting the 
article, the website functions as an ICP.  By providing a forum 
for comments, the website functions as an ISP.  In this example, 
the nature of solicitation is neutral because the website merely 
seeks a response to the content of an article regardless of what it 
is.  The website is neutral to what the third parties post in 
response.  Intentional solicitation, on the other hand, is the 
behavior that websites like JuicyCampus engage in.  In the case 
of the gossip websites mentioned above and the blog in Shiamili, 
the specific kind of information sought out is malicious and 
inflammatory. 
When websites engage in intentional solicitation, they are 
undermining one of the two reasons for enacting § 230: 
encouraging self-policing.  In fact, providing immunity to those 
 
172 See supra Part II.D.1. 
173 See supra Part I. 
174 See, e.g., Ethan Bronner, Pennsylvania Judge Puts Voter ID Law on Hold for 
Election, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/03/us/ 
pennsylvania-judge-delays-implementation-of-voter-id-law.html; see also Terms of 
Service, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/content/help/rights/terms/terms-of-
service.html (last updated Jan. 9, 2014). 
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who solicit salacious content does the exact opposite.  The current 
policy suggests that there is no difference between those who 
make a good faith effort to self-police, thereby working to 
maintain a high quality standard as to the information they 
disperse, and those who refuse to remove objectionable content 
because they like stirring up controversy.  As a result, the 
Internet has become a safe-harbor for those who wish to promote 
content that would be unacceptable if broadcast through a 
different medium.  At this point in time, unlike when § 230 was 
enacted, the Internet is an expansive and thriving network.175  
Therefore, it is more important to reestablish the policy 
encouraging self-policing and to establish a policy discouraging 
development of malicious websites. 
The proposed prong will both reinforce the policy of 
encouraging self-policing176 and will discourage websites that 
exist only to inflame and create controversy from developing.  
Removing ISPs’ unconditional immunity will encourage website 
operators to think twice about what content they choose to 
permit on their website.  The safeguard for those who cannot 
remove all objectionable third-party content would still be an 
easily satisfied test, provided the ISPs did not intentionally 
solicit malicious or recklessly harmful material.  This key 
distinction benefits society by protecting the integrity of school 
campuses, minimizing small town rumor mills, and diminishing 
the availability of forums to interfere with business competitors’ 
livelihoods.  Moreover, if an ISP falls within the safeguard, the 
website may be given a chance to cure without being subject to 
harsh liability. 
Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, this test would 
be a proactive step in the fight against cyberbullying.  By 
removing ISP immunity on websites that solicit salacious 
comments from anonymous users, websites will be less inclined 
to provide anonymous forums with purely malicious content.  
Potential liability would urge ISPs to take greater care regarding 
the content they choose to promote and request from their users. 
 
175 See generally Berners-Lee, supra note 84. 
176 While this test would encourage self-policing, it does not necessarily impose a 
mandatory duty to monitor and cure. That discussion is outside the scope of this 
Note. 
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C. Objectionable Content 
The third proposed prong requires courts to evaluate what 
type of material should be protected.  This analytical step 
recognizes that there are different levels of objectionable content, 
and providers of the more malicious content should not benefit 
from the protections afforded by § 230.  This prong mimics the 
primary purpose prong of the test, applying the same social 
utility standard to individual content.  When a statement’s only 
value is to publicly embarrass or inflict pain, the victim should 
have a form of recourse regardless of the medium employed to 
disperse the statement.  If, on the other hand, the statement 
contains information that provides a benefit to the public in some 
way, the website should maintain its immunity. 
Unlike the federal statute, state laws impute liability for 
content that the common law found the most unseemly.177  When 
such content is at issue, states classify it as defamatory per se.178  
In the event that particular libel or slander is defamatory per se, 
the defendant is unfailingly liable.179 
It is unconvincing to argue that federal law should prevail 
over state law for objectionable content because the Internet is so 
expansive and crosses state lines.  As it stands, the federal law 
immunizes Internet providers in any state, whereas their print 
counterparts would be held liable under state law.  When 
defamatory content is presented in another medium, state 
defamation law would apply in order to determine liability.  
Innocent victims of defamatory content posted on the Internet 
deserve the same relief that they would have received had the 
same content been presented through a medium other than the 
Internet.  Much of the content on JuicyCampus, for example, was 
defamatory per se, and actionable if false.180  Users made 
statements about the sexual conduct of their peers and 
allegations that their peers carry sexually transmitted 
infections.181  Under most state laws, there is no question that 
publicly and falsely stating that a female is promiscuous would 
 
177 See supra Part II.A. 
178 See id. 
179 See id. 
180 See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text. 
181 Jenna Wortham, JuicyCampus, Collegiate Tabloid, Goes Offline, N.Y. TIMES 
BITS (Feb. 5, 2009, 4:47 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/05/juicycampus-
collegiate-tabloid-goes-offline/. 
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result in liability regardless of whether that statement was 
printed in a newspaper or announced over the radio.182  But the 
fact that the statement was posted on the Internet, where the 
website only provided a forum for “juicy” posts, activated § 230 
immunity. 
Because the federal law does prevail, however, it is 
important to consider the type of content we, as a society, want to 
protect and encourage.  The Internet makes it easy for people 
with access to express themselves.  If we provide immunity to 
those who encourage third parties to express themselves while 
inflicting legal injury upon others, injuries that would have a 
remedy in any other situation, it will be impossible to protect the 
typical citizen’s privacy and reputation. 
As young adults are constantly reminded, anything posted to 
the Internet leaves a digital footprint.  When employers are 
vetting their candidates, the first place they look is the Internet.  
The implications of protecting content that harms the victim in 
both the present and future are enormous.  Courts should, 
therefore, be required to balance the merits of the content 
against the potential damage it could cause. 
If the first proposed prong is satisfied because certain 
content was actively solicited, and if that same content would be 
protected in another medium, § 230 immunity should not apply.  
Content that the common law has recognized as defamatory per 
se is equally as injurious on the Internet as it is in print.  
Comments that are considered defamatory per se under state law 
are those that society discourages because their contents are 
particularly injurious.183  Changing the medium through which 
someone’s reputation is attacked does not negate the impact of 
the words.  In fact, the Internet allows for those same words to be 
spread to more people at a faster rate.  Because the Internet can 
be accessed by anyone from almost anywhere, defamatory 
content spreads much more easily and increases the potential 
that an individual’s reputation will be harmed. 
 
182 See SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 4. 
183 See id. 
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D. Test Case 
For all the reasons expressed in Chief Judge Lippman’s 
dissent,184 the outcome of Shiamili under the Zeran test was 
unsatisfactory.  However, if the court had applied the minority 
circuit tests, the result still would have fallen victim to Chief 
Judge Lippman’s criticisms.  Under the Seventh Circuit’s first 
approach of reading § 230(c)(1) as a definitional clause, Real 
Estate would only be immune “if it created the objectionable 
information.”185  However, because the content was posted by a 
third party, Real Estate would claim that it could not have 
created the content because the third party who posted it created 
it.186  Under the second approach the Seventh Circuit articulates, 
because this is an action for defamation, a cause of action that 
depends on treating the blog operator as a “publisher,” the blog’s 
liability as an ISP would be foreclosed.187  Although the Tenth 
Circuit’s approach would yield a satisfactory result in this case, 
websites like Yelp and Angie’s List would be open to liability, 
despite the intent of CDA § 230 to immunize those types of 
beneficial websites. 
If the New York State Court of Appeals had added these 
three additional prongs to its analysis, the result of Shiamili 
could have been considerably different.  The Court determined 
that Real Estate was an ISP, that Real Estate was acting as a 
publisher, and that the information was provided by a third 
party, thereby implicating § 230 immunity.  When the three 
proposed prongs are applied, however, Real Estate might not be 
provided immunity because it would lack a primary purpose 
other than to instigate injurious dialogue, be both an active and 
soliciting website, and the nature of the content would be, on its 
face, defamatory.188 
Under the first prong, because the blog itself served no 
purpose other than to broadcast negative information about 
Shiamili’s personal life, Real Estate would be subject to 
 
184 See supra Part III.A.2. 
185 Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2003). 
186 See supra Part III.B.1. 
187 Id. 
188 If only a few of the comments resulted in defamatory content, and the 
primary purpose was to actually solicit real estate listings, the primary purpose test 
would not be satisfied, and therefore, the defendants would be afforded § 230 
immunity. 
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evaluation under the other two prongs.  Had Real Estate been 
trying to provide useful information to consumers instead of 
encouraging attacks against Shiamili with no social utility, the 
analysis would end here and immunity would be activated.  This 
is where the Tenth Circuit’s approach would fail because in the 
event that Real Estate was providing a beneficial service through 
this blog, it would not be protected by § 230. 
Second, Real Estate satisfies the proposed second prong as 
an active website.  Real Estate upgraded the defamatory 
comment by “Ardor Real Estate Sucks” to a standalone post and 
added an illustration, headline, and a fresh forum for comments.  
By upgrading the initial comment to a standalone post, Real 
Estate indicated that this type of content is supported by its 
website.  While the content of that comment is covered by § 230, 
immunity does not apply to the comments that resulted because 
Real Estate flagrantly supported the initial comment’s 
assertions.  Broadcasting its support for the post by “Ardor Real 
Estate Sucks” informed the blog’s readers that this is the kind of 
content the website supports.  Conveying its support and then 
adding the open—and once again, anonymous—comment forum 
below the post indicates that Real Estate was asking its users to 
respond to the hateful comment it supported, and any reasonable 
user would understand that the website was seeking more 
injurious content about Shiamili. 
Even if the court decided that the acts of upgrading and 
establishing a new forum are insufficient to establish solicitation, 
the website operator blatantly encouraged third parties to 
continue posting hateful comments about Shiamili by responding 
to a new comment on the thread.  One particularly malicious 
comment concluded, “call me a Liar and I’ll come back here and 
get REALLY specific.”189  Real Estate’s website operator replied 
to that comment with the sole word “liar” under a pseudonym.190  
This action alone suffices as active solicitation.  Such 
encouragement was the equivalent of asking the poster to add 
more specific harmful information about Shiamili. 
Third, the content generated on the new forum falls within 
the bounds of defamation per se, and therefore the content at 
issue is objectionable on its face.  Alleging that Shiamili 
 
189 Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of N.Y., Inc., 17 N.Y.3d 281, 285, 952 N.E.2d 
1011, 1014, 929 N.Y.S.2d 19, 22 (2011). 
190 Id. 
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“mistreated his employees, could not retain real estate agents, 
[and] failed to pay office bills”191 falls directly within defamation 
per se under the category of imputing misconduct in an 
individual’s profession or office.192  Because the content is 
defamatory per se, under New York law, Real Estate would be 
liable for defamation.  Under this new test, immunity would not 
apply because Real Estate actively solicited defamatory content, 
and the content is objectionable on its face because it is 
defamatory per se. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note sought to demonstrate that the scope of § 230 
should be narrowed to better promote the policies underlying its 
enactment.  While this Note appreciates the merits of granting 
immunity to passive ISPs, defamation victims deserve a means of 
recourse regardless of whether the statements at issue are 
printed in a newspaper, broadcast over the radio, or published for 
the world to see on an active, soliciting Internet website.  
Accordingly, this Note has identified the wide array of problems 
with granting active ISPs immunity for third-party content and 
proposed a test that will narrow the scope of § 230 where ISPs 
lack social utility and actively solicit content that is objectionable 
on its face, thereby establishing a system for victims of Internet-
based defamation to obtain justice. 
 
 
191 Id. at 293, 952 N.E.2d at 1020, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 28 (Lippman, C.J., 
dissenting). 
192 50 AM. JUR. 2D Libel and Slander § 202 (2012) (“[C]ommunication is 
defamatory per se if it imputes misconduct in a person’s trade, profession, office, or 
occupation.”). 
